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Columnists: John Llewellyn, Llewellyn Consulting

Published on: 4 Apr 2014

Formula 1: a case study in incentives

When suitably incentivised, technologists and engineers can achieve astonishing energy saving

Clever people can achieve extraordinary things

Technologists and engineers can achieve astonishing things when they put their minds to a problem. There are few more graphic examples than what is currently happening in Formula One (F1): and this carries powerful lessons for achieving energy efficiency gains more generally.

Three years ago, the F1 authorities announced “… probably the greatest change in regulations in F1 history .” [1] In summary, the 2.4-litre normally-aspirated V8 engines were to be replaced in 2014 by 1.6-litre turbo-charged V6 engines ‒ a reduction in capacity of one-third. At the same time fuel consumption, which had hitherto been unlimited, but typically averaged around 160 kg per race, was to be limited to 100 kg ‒ a reduction of around 40%.

F1 engineers are achieving massive fuel efficiency gains

Certainly the internal combustion engine offers scope for efficiency gain: of every litre of fuel burned, around one-third of the energy goes out the exhaust, and one-third is lost as heat through the radiator. Only the remaining third actually propels the car - and of that third, quite a lot is turned into heat when the car brakes. Hence the two new energy-recovery systems in this season’s F1 cars: the first converts kinetic energy released under braking into electrical energy; the second converts exhaust energy into electrical energy. The electricity from both sources is stored in batteries, and used to propel the car.

The net result? Whereas the previous V8s produced more than 750 brake horsepower (bhp), the one-third-smaller 2014 V6 units are reckoned to be putting out around 600 bhp – a reduction of just 20%. [2] In addition, the energy recovery systems are apparently delivering, for up to 33 seconds per lap, a further 160 bhp. Thus new technology is delivering the same peak power output (600 + 160 = 760 bhp), as the earlier engines, while using 40% less fuel overall. Astonishing.

It is only a matter of time before these developments find their application in everyday motor vehicles. Indeed, earlier-generation kinetic energy recovery systems are already in operation in some vehicles, including in city buses which, because of their weight and stop-start operation, release considerable kinetic energy that would otherwise be wasted.

While F1 is a small operation in itself, the ultimate effects of just this single new technology, spread over millions of new cars, trucks and buses, as in due course it will be, could well be to reduce world oil consumption by 2% or more per year over coming decades. ^[3] But this F1 experience has a deeper significance:  it shows what clever people can achieve when motivated.

The lessons: motivation is a key prerequisite

Sometimes, scientific curiosity is sufficient motivation: witness world-wide-web inventor Tim Berners-Lee who, as a matter of principle, never commercialised his invention, preferring to work on expanding the use of the net as a channel for free expression and collaboration.

Sometimes money is the incentive. In 1714 one John Harrison, incentivised by prize money of £20,000 (≈ £3m today) revolutionised navigation by constructing a series of clocks that enabled a ship’s position to be calculated accurately. [4] Fear and patriotism too can be potent motivators.

... and such operations have to be well organised

However, such activities generally need also to be organised. This typically requires that government be involved, to: identify the problem; specify it; corral key people; offer the prize; provide funding. Witness World War II, which on that basis produced radar; radio navigation; the jet engine; rocketry; nuclear energy. Or space exploration: while increasingly now a private sector venture, would it have started without government involvement? Would nuclear energy?

Global climate policy is not applying such principles

Such examples contrast with what is happening in respect of one of the biggest challenges the world now faces - to stabilise atmospheric greenhouse-gas concentration. Failure stands to result in major economic loss, probably with geopolitical consequences. Yet, by the standards of past achievements, governments have responded only with half-hearted, disparate regulations and economic incentives, directed primarily at reducing emissions. And these are not working: emissions are still rising; and earlier modest growth in global energy efficiency has now stalled. [5]

Conclusion

The net result: policy will shift increasingly to adaptation

Unless governments drive processes that would result in the invention and then implementation of new technology to solve the global emissions problem, the result risks simply being a continuation of the present weak action on emissions. And the result of that will be that action will increasingly have to be directed at adaptation, rather than mitigation.

[1] Paddy Lowe, Mercedes Executive Director (technical) http://www.formula1.com/news/interviews/2014/1/15428.html

[2] There are however rumours that Mercedes is exceeding this figure by around 100 bhp. And it is to be expected that, as the season progresses, all teams will achieve further increases in engine power.

[3] Automobiles and trucks represent a little under 50% of world primary oil demand. Hence a 40% improvement in energy efficiency spread over half the world’s fleet over a ten-year period would reduce oil demand, relative to what it would have been otherwise, by  ((40% *0.5) / 10 years) = 2% per year. In practice, automotive fuel efficiency could improve by more than that because many engines – especially in the US – are considerably larger than elsewhere e.g. Europe. And the highest mileages are likely to be made by the newer vehicles.

[4] See Sobel, D. (1996). Longitude , Fourth Estate, London.

[5] Global energy intensity – defined as total energy consumption divided by real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ‒ declined by 1.3% per year on average in the 1990s, but the decline dropped to a mere 0.4% per year during the 2000s. (Source: IEA)

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